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RELETTING THE ABANDONED OR
DEFAULTED PUBLIC WORKS PROJECT IN
NEW YORK-TO BID OR NOT TO BID?
Bruce J. Bergman*
I.

Introduction

The general requirement that contracts for public works be let
pursuant to advertisements for bids to the lowest responsible bidder' has long been the law in New York and other jurisdictions.2 The
purpose is to prevent corruption, favoritism, and reckless expendiure, while obtaining the best contract terms; 3 the intended beneficiary is the public entity involved.4
Member of the New York Bar. Mr. Bergman is associated with the
firm of Jarvis, Pilz, Buckley & Treacy.
1. There are scores of statutes mandating this requirement. See statutes cited in notes 30-35 infra.
2. See, e.g., Sweet Associates v. Gallmon, 36 App. Div. 2d 95, 318
N.Y.S.2d 528 (3d Dep't 1971), aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 902 (1972); Gottfried
Baking Co. v. Allen, 45 Misc. 2d 708, 257 N.Y.S.2d 833 (Sup. Ct. 1964);
Glen Truck Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Sirignano, 31 Misc. 2d 1027, 220
N.Y.S.2d 939 (Sup. Ct. 1961); 10 E. MCQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS
§ 29.29 (3d ed. 1966) [hereinafter cited as MCQUILLAN]. See also N.Y.
GEN. MUN. LAW § 100-a (McKinney 1965).
3. See General Bldg. Contractors v. Board of Trustees, 42 App. Div. 2d
660, 345 N.Y.S.2d 195 (3d Dep't 1973); Warren Bros. v. Craner, 30 App.
Div. 2d 437, 293 N.Y.S.2d 763 (4th Dep't 1968); Allen v. Eberling, 24 App.Div. 2d 594, 262 N.Y.S.2d 121 (2d Dep't 1965); Fonesca v. Board of Educ.,
58 Misc. 2d 223, 294 N.Y.S.2d 952 (Sup. Ct. 1968); Carroll-Ratner Corp.
v. City Manager, 54 Misc. 2d 625, 283 N.Y.S.2d 218 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd mem.,
36 App. Div. 2d 795, 320 N.Y.S.2d 715 (2d Dep't 1967):
4. Only contracts over a certain sum are included. N.Y. GEN. MUN.
LAW § 103 (McKinney Supp. 1974) sets the amount at $3,500.00, but this
sum varies from statute to statute with amendments over the years increasing the figures. Furithermore there is wide variation with reference to
the nature of contracts which are subject to bidding requirements. Some
of the areas which have been the subject of opinion and litigation include:
machinery operators hired on an hourly basis under supervision of village
employees, 16 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 49 (1960); aggregate cost computations,
24 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 116 (1968); 18 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 354 (1962); work
partially done by municipal employees, 23 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 252 (1967)
*
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Uniformly, these bidding requirements have been held to be mandatory.5 After determining that the madatory statutory pronouncements apply to a particular contract, there is an entire "second
level" problem of the propriety of bids and the awarding of the
contract pursuant thereto.
(No. 67-310); 16 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 49 (1960); combined purchases of
items, 18 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 483 (1962); rental agreements, 27 Op. N.Y.
ST. COMP. 186 (1971) (No. 71-872); 23 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 567 (1967); book
purchases, 19 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 32 (1963); fire equipment purchases,
Signacon Controls, Inc. v. Mulroy, 69 Misc. 2d 63, 329 N.Y.S.2d 175 (Sup.
Ct.) (mem.), aff'd, 39 App. Div. 2d 1013, 335 N.Y.S.2d 256 (4th Dep't
1972); food purchases, 12 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 169 (1956); gasoline purchases, 24 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 490 (1968); office equipment, 23 Op. N.Y.
ST. COMP. 866 (1967); printing contracts, 25 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 314 (1969);
18 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 354 (1962); splitting work contracts, 18 Op. N.Y.
ST. COMP. 290 (1962) (No. 62-565); maintenance and repair contracts, 25
Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 336 (1969); 15 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 130 (1959); costplus contracts, 9 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 311 (1953); monopolies, 23 Op. N.Y.
ST. COMP. 500 (1967); 11 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 502 (1955); professional service contracts, 24 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 437 (1968); 17 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 279
(1961); insurance policies, 17 Op. N.Y. ST. CoMP. 126 (1961); 10 Op. N.Y.
ST. COMP. 14 (1954) (No. 6528); and special skills, Hurd v. Erie County,
34 App. Div. 2d 289, 310 N.Y.S.2d 953 (4th Dep't 1970). See also
McQUILLN §§ 29.33-29.35, 29.40, 29.42; Annot., 15 A.L.R.3d 733 (1967);
Note, The Necessity of Competitive Bidding in Municipal Contracts, 27
U. Pirr. L. REV. 117 (1965).
5. See MCQUILLAN § 29.30; Note, The Neccessity of Competitive Bidding in Municipal Contracts, 27 U. Prrr. L. REV. 117 (1965). Obviously
though, the bidding requirements are not mandatory across the broad
spectrum of contracts which have been held not to come within the contemplation of the statutes. See cases cited in note 2 supra. One example,
of the many cited in note 2, is the monopoly situation. Where there is but
one source of supply for an item, it has been held that the statutes could
not have intended that a public body go through the motions of competitive bidding. The leading and clearly the most significant decision in this
area is Harlem Gas-Light Co. v. City of New York, 33 N.Y. 309 (1865). See
also 23 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 502 (1955); 10 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 323 (1954).
6. This raises issues far beyond the scope of this article. However, the
bidding problems associated with the statutes in question are important
to any contractor (or supplier), as well as to public bodies. Some of the
topics that have been considered are: proper advertising media, McDonough v. Board of Educ., 20 Misc. 2d 98, 189 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup. Ct.
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. With the probable exception of North Carolina,7 the courts8 consistently held that where a public contract is let improperly, the
1959); timeliness of bid, Wiltom Coach Co. v. Central High School
Dist. No. 3, 36 Misc. 2d 637, 232 N.Y.S.2d 876 (Sup. Ct. 1962); In re
Mulhollen, 77 N.Y. ST. DEP'T OF EDUC. 95 (1956); bidding signature
requirements, In re Island Air Conditioning Co., 1 N.Y. EDUC. DEP'T
REP. 482 (1960); 19 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 313 (1963); security requirements, Rockland Bus Lines, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 43 Misc. 2d 1060, 252
N.Y.S.2d 712 (Sup. Ct. 1964); In re J.N. Futia Co., 2 N.Y. EDUC. DEP'T
REP. 143 (1962); 24 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 586 (1968); bidder responsibility,
Seacoast Constr. Corp. v. Lockport Urban Renewal Agency, 72 Misc. 2d
372, 339 N.Y.S.2d 188 (Sup. Ct. 1972); Harrow Transp. Co. v. Board of
Educ., 71 Misc. 2d 139, 335 N.Y.S.2d 465 (Sup. Ct. 1972); In re Laboratory
Furniture Co., 1 N.Y. EDUC. DEP'T REP. 353 (1959); aggrieved bidder's
burden of proof, W. J. Gaskell, Inc. v. Maslanka, 33 Misc. 2d 88, 225
N.Y.S.2d 94 (Sup. Ct. 1962); Meyer v. Board of Educ., 31 Misc. 2d 407,
221 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Sup. Ct. 1961); extent of awarding authority's discretion, Consolidated Sheet Metal Workers, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 62 Misc.
2d 445, 308 N.Y.S.2d 773 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Caruci v. Dulan, 41 Misc. 2d
859, 246 N.Y.S.2d 727 (Sup. Ct. 1964); Hopkins v. Hanna, 135 Misc. 750,
239 N.Y.S. 489 (Sup. Ct. 1930); acceptance of non-responsive bid, Glen
Truck Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Sivignano, 31 Misc. 2d 1027, 220 N.Y.S.2d 939
(Sup. Ct. 1961); 16 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 439 (1960); rejection of noncomplying bid, Rockland Haulage, Inc. v. Village of Upper Nyack, 13 App.
Div. 2d 819, 216 N.Y.S.2d 308 (2d Dep't 1961); Southern Steel Co. v.
County of Suffolk, 51 Misc. 2d 198, 273 N.Y.S.2d 99 (Sup. Ct. 1966).
7. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Town of Dallas, 229 N.C. 561, 50 S.E.2d 561
(1948); McQuiLLAN § 29.41.

8. See, e.g., Jered Contracting Corp. v. New York City Transit Auth.,
22 N.Y.2d 187, 239 N.E.2d 197, 292 N.Y.S.2d 98 (1968); Albany Supply &
Equip. Co. v. City of Cohoes, 18 N.Y.2d 968, 224 N.E.2d 716, 278 N.Y.S.2d
207 (1966); Prosper Contracting Corp. v. Board of Educ., 43 App. Div. 2d
823, 351 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1st Dep't 1974); 13 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 278 (1957);
9 Op. N.Y. COMP. 431 (1953). There is possible conflict in ten other jurisdictions: Alabama, Arizona, Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota, Nebraska, New
Jersey, North Dakota, Texas, and Washington. Assuming that a public
contract has been improperly let, all the authorities agree that the contract
is void. To the extent that there is disagreement, it revolves around the
theory that even though the contract is void, there may be some recovery
under an equitable doctrine, such as quasi contract, contract implied in
law or unjust enrichment. Only these ten states and North Carolina subscribe to this theory. A detailed discussion of these avenues of approach is
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contract is void and the contractor cannot recover even though the
public body has received the benefits of the contract.'
Because the volume of litigation on bidding statutes is considerable, contractors (or suppliers and materialmen) and their counsel
are generally aware of the requirements. Thus, the extremely harsh
New York rules'" imposing penalties upon contractors who are parties to public contracts violative of the bidding statutes can be
avoided.
But suppose a contractor has defaulted or abandoned a valid
public works contract? Must the public entity now readvertise for
bids for the completion of the work? The answer in most instances
is "no," and this raises the disconcerting specter of a single unsupervised public official having the power to let potentially huge contracts.
Of course the size of the relet contract is not the prime consideration. The key point is that the laboriously developed bidding laws
can be circumvented in default and abandonment situations, resulting in favortism for the contractor and a bad bargain for the taxpayers.
However, the other side of the question is equally vexing. An
abandoned or defaulted contract may require immediate continuation or remedial action; e.g., when a city's milk supplier is in default, or work on a vital sewer line is terminated. If such situations
do not fit into the public emergency exception, must the public body
expend the time, effort, and expense to analyze the supplies needed
or work remaining, " formulate proposed contracts, and advertise for
beyond the scope of this article, but is discussed quite thoroughly at
Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 397 (1970) and Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 1164 (1970). See
also 55 MARQ. L. REV. 397 (1972); McQUILLIN § 29.112.
9. See Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 397 (1970); Annot., 33 A.L.R.3d 1164
(1970).
10. See text accompanying notes 27-41 infra. The statement that the
rules are harsh is not in and of itself to be construed as a value judgment
on the part of the author. Where a contractor has knowingly done something illegal or morally reprehensible, or has in some manner affirmatively
acted to take unfair advantage of a public entity or another contractor, he
assumes the risks of his actions and is deserving of no sympathy. However
the problem lies with the technical violation committed unintentionally
which can have disastrous consequences upon the contractor if the contract
is thereafter declared illegal.
11. See text accompanying notes 42-54 infra.
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bids? Compounding this difficulty is the confusing and conflicting
status of the legal requirements in New York for the reletting of
abandoned or defaulted work.
II.

Consequences of the Void Public Contract

If a relet contract is not advertised for bids when it should be, any
contractor who accepts the contract, innocently or otherwise, exposes himself to the possibility that a court may find the contract
void. This is particularly important in New York, where the implications of the void public contract are extended further than other
states, i.e., not only may the public body avoid paying the contractor, it may, in addition, recover all the money it had ,already paid
2
under the contract.1
Since the prospective bidders wish to preclude the disastrous effects of a void public contract they should first examine those decisions that set the ground rules. The most frequently cited decision
in this area is Gerzoff v. Sweeney, 3 which was twice before the New
York Court of Appeals. In Gerzoff, the court found that certain
village officials illegally 4 had drafted contract specifications favoring one bidder to the exclusion of others. 5 As a result, the Village
of Freeport purchased a generator more expensive than the one it
otherwise would have bought. In declaring the contract null and
void, the court enumerated these important principles:
The applicable statute, section 103 of the General Municipal Law, provides
that a contract for public work, such as the one here in question, is to be
awarded 'to the lowest responsible bidder . . . after advertisement for sealed
bids.' The law is based, this court long ago declared, 'upon motives of public
economy, and originated, perhaps, in some degree of distrust of the officers
to whom the duty of making contracts for the public service was committed.
If executed according to its intention, it will preclude favoritism and jobbing,
and such was its obvious purpose. It does not require any argument to show

12. See Fabrizio & Martin, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 290 F. Supp. 945
(S.D.N.Y. 1968); S.T. Grand, Inc. v. City of New York, 32 N.Y.2d 300, 298
N.E.2d 105, 344 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1973); Gerzof v. Sweeney, 22 N.Y.2d 297,

239 N.E.2d 521, 292 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1968); Gerzof v. Sweeney, 16 N.Y.2d
206, 211 N.E.2d 826, 264 N.Y.S.2d 376 (1965).
13. 22 N.Y.2d 297, 239 N.E.2d 521, 292 N.Y.S.2d 640 (1968); 16 N.Y.2d
206, 211 N.E.2d 826, 264 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1965).
14. 16 N.Y.2d at 209, 211 N.E.2d at 829, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 379.

15.

This is one of the abuses bidding statutes seek to cure.
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that a contract made in violation of its requirements is null and void. .. .'
Moreover, once a contract is proved to have been awarded without the
required competitive bidding, a waste of public funds is presumed and a
taxpayer is entitled to have the contract set aside without showing that the
municipality suffered any actual injury. .

.

. It is sufficient in such a situa-

tion that the public 'has been deprived of the protection which the law was
intended to afford.'
If a municipality awards a contract without advertising for bids, when
required, the contract would, concededly, be illegal. And

. .

. 'the contract

likewise would be illegal' if the municipality 'had accomplished the same
result by indirection, that is: had so fixed or manipulated the specifications
as to shut out competitive bidding or permit unfair advantage or
favoritism."'

The court then postulated the general rule that where the contract is illegal, there is justification and precedent for the contractor
to pay back to the municipality all sums received, while the public
body retains the benefit of the work done and/or the materials received. The court's rationale was:
There should, logically, be no difference in ultimate consequence between
the case where a vendor has been paid under an illegal contract and the one
in which payment has not yet been made. If, in the latter case, he is denied
payment, he should, in the former, be required to return the payment unlawfully received-and he should not be excused from making this refund simply
because it is impossible or intolerably difficult for the municipality to restore
the illegally purchased goods or services to the vendor. In neither case can
the usual concern of equity to prevent unjust enrichment be allowed to overcome and extinguish the special safeguards which the Legislature has provided for the public treasury. 7

Although the Gerzoff court endorsed this general rule, it did not
require the contractor to return the entire consideration ($757,625)
received from the Village. It concluded that the purposes of the
competitive bidding statutes would be fully vindicated if the contractor was required to pay the price difference between the generator the Village intended to purchase and defendant's generator plus
the higher cost of installation. This computation totalled $178,636. 8
16. 16 N.Y.2d at 208-09, 211 N.E.2d at 827, 264 N.Y.S.2d at 378-79
(citations omitted).
17. 22 N.Y.2d at 305, 239 N.E.2d at 523-24, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 644.
18. The remedy chosen by the court consisted of the price difference
between the generator the Village of Freeport intended to purchase and
defendant's generator plus the higher cost of installation. This computa-
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In short, the court's remedy was designed to place the municipality
in the position it would have been in but for the illegality.
A particularly harsh application of the rule occurred in S.T.
Grand, Inc. v. City of New York, 9 in a 1973 decision of the court of
appeals. In 1966, the plaintiff contractor and the defendant city
contracted for the cleaning of a reservoir. The contractor bribed A
commissioner to let the contract without competitive bidding; the
commissioner invoked the "public emergency" exception to the general bidding requirements." The contractor completed the work but
together with its president, was convicted in a federal action of
conspiracy to use interstate facilities with the intent to violate New
York state bribery laws.
When the contractor sued the city for the unpaid balance due on
the contract, the city interposed the defense that the contract was
illegal because of the bribery, and counterclaimed for the entire sum
($689,500) it had previously paid. The court of appeals granted summary judgment to the city both on its entire counterclaim and on
the motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for the balance due." 1 The
court affirmed the stringent general rule which works a complete
forfeiture of the contractor's interest as necessary to deter violation
of bidding statutes. While acknowledging the Gerzoff deviation
from the general rule, the court stated that the remedy applied there
would not be available to the contractor in this case, in part because
the illegality in Gerzoff "infected only the final stages of the municipal contracting process, while in the instant case, the illegality goes
to the origins of that process." 2
The cases from Gerzoff to S. T. Grand contained some element of
moral turpitude. 3 However, even though the final result may be
somewhat affected by circumstance, one cannot, and indeed must
not, conclude that if the contractor violates a bidding statute innocently, he will emerge unscathed. Quite the opposite is true, and a
rather startling example is found in Fabrizio& Martin, Inc. v. Board
tion totaled $178,636 as compared to $757,625. Id. at 307-08, 239 N.E.2d
at 525, 292 N.Y.S.2d at 646.
19. 32 N.Y.2d 300, 298 N.E.2d 105, 344 N.Y.S.2d 938 (1973).
20. See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 103(4) (McKinney 1965).
21. 32 N.Y1 2d at 307, 298 N.E.2d at 109, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 944.
22. Id., 298 N.E.2d at 109, 344 N.Y.S.2d at 943.
23. See text accompanying notes 14-23 supra.
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of Education,24 where the court, absent any hint of fraud, imposed
a severe penalty upon an innocent contractor.
In 1963, a school board advertised bids for general construction
of a school. Of the six bids submitted, the two lowest were from
Rand and Fabrizio. Low bidder Rand was awarded the contract but
was allowed to withdraw its bid when it discovered an error in computation. Fabrizio, as second low bidder, was awarded the contract.
However, it too had miscalculated, underestimating its bid by some
$171,000. Accordingly, Fabrizio sought permission to withdraw or
correct its bid. Extensive negotiations followed, and the parties
agreed that the plans and specifications would be changed to compensate for the error. To'effectuate the modification, a change order
was issued and incorporated into the contract. In 1966, during the
construction, a dispute arose between Fabrizio and the board; Fabrizio was declared in default when it refused to continue work when
its demands were not satisfied.
Fabrizio sued for breach of contract. The board moved to stay the
suit pending arbitration, at which time two taxpayers intervened
claiming that the contract was illegal. The court agreed, ruling that
the effect of the change order on the original plans and specifications was such that new bids should have been requested on what
was in fact a new contract.
The board then answered Fabrizio's complaint, seeking recovery
of all monies paid to Fabrizio together with damages caused by the
contractor's alleged breach. The court dismissed the complaint, ruling that the contractor could not base any recovery upon an invalid
contract. While the board in turn could not recover all the money
paid to the contractor, the court ruled it could recover all the damages it could prove were suffered. Even though the trial to prove
damages is still pending-with the likelihood that it will never
occur 2 -the point is clear. In a suit on a contract awarded by deny-

ing other bidders an opportunity to participate, the contractor can
collect nothing and the public authority can collect all damages it
can prove.
24. 290 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The factual background of
Fabrizio that follows in the text is derived from Board of Educ. v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 453 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971).

25. This is based on personal investigation.
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III. Reletting-The General Rule
To avoid becoming a party to an illegal contract, interested parties must carefully study the statutes, the authorities, and the case
law. Unfortunately, the general rule is misleading in its emphasis:
If a contractor abandons the work, and the municipality has the power under
the contract to finish it and charge the contractor with the expense, it has
been held that the requirement for letting contracts on competitive bids does
not apply.2"

In order to properly apply this rule, it is necessary to construe the
contract. In the absence of a clear contractual provision, the general
rule, cited in at least two opinions of the State Comptroller,27 is that:
If there is no special provision in the statute or charter in regard to reletting,
it is generally held that if the contract is abandoned the municipality may
proceed to complete the work without again advertising for bids ....

Thus, the critical consideration which emerges is when is there a
special statute or charter provision in regard to reletting public
contracts?
The New York statutes referring to public contracts and their
requirements are legion. There are also requirements for the various public authorities found in various sections of the Public Authorities Law.30

26. McQuILLAN § 29.39 (citations omitted). "In case of an emergency,
where it is essential to the health, safety, or welfare of the people that
immediate action be taken, the requirement [of bidding] may be dispensed with." Id. § 29.38 (footnote omitted).
27. 18 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 252 (1962); 16 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 140 (1960).
28. McQUILLAN § 29.39 (footnotes omitted).
29. E.g., NEW YORK, N.Y., CHARTER §§ 343(a), (b); see N.Y. EDUC. LAW
§ 376 (McKinney 1969); N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 103(1) (McKinney 1965);
N.Y. STATE FIN. LAW § 135 (McKinney 1974); N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 122,
176(23-a), 197, 222 (McKinney 1969).
30. See N.Y. PUB. AUTH. LAW 9§ 530 (N.Y.S. Bridge Auth.), 559 (Triborough Bridge & Tunnel Auth.), 659 (Nassau Co. Bridge Auth.), 890
(Genesee Valley Regional Market Auth.), 1069 (Erie Co. Water Auth.),
1088 (Suffolk Co. Water Auth.), 1108 (Monroe Co. Water Auth.), 1166
(Onondaga Co. Water Auth.), 1181 (Buffalo Sewer Auth.), 1209 (N.Y.C.
Transit Auth.), 1246 (Great Neck Water Auth.), 1349-j (Rochester-Monroe
Co. Port Auth.), 1385 (Ogdensburg Port Auth.), 1431 (White Plains Park-
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While the statutory intent is clear 3 -to avoid waste of public
funds and require competitive bidding for contracts in excess of
varying sums-the statutory requirements for reletting when an
abandoned or defaulted contract previously advertised and let (pursuant to statute) is abandoned or defaulted are unclear.
IV.

Reletting-Specific Statutory Authority

Although no state statutes specifically address the issue of advertising for bid requirements upon an abandonment or default, New
York City has enacted a section of the Administrative Code which
is directly applicable:32
Performance of contractsa. Each agency shall require and enforce the faithful performance of every
contract made by it.
b. If the contractor or contractors shall fail in any respect to fulfill the
contract within the time limited for its performance, then the agency in
charge thereof shall complete the same in the manner provided for in the
contract. The cost of such completion shall be a charge against such delinquent contractor or contractors.
c. If any work shall be abandoned by any contractor, the appropriate
agency, if the best interests of the city be thereby served, and subject to the
approval of the board of estimate, may adopt all subcontracts made by such
contractor for such work. All subcontractors shall be bound by such adoption.
The agency shall readvertise and relet the work specified in the original

ing Auth.), 1456 (Elmira Parking Auth.), 1481 (Syracuse Parking Auth.),
1506 (Peekskill Parking Auth.), 1531 (Fulton Parking Auth.), 1551 (Tuckahoe Parking Auth.), 1556 (Endicott Parking Auth.), 1569-g (Troy Parking
Auth.), 1585-g (Port Jervis Parking Auth.), 1595-g (Owego Parking Auth.),
1596-g (Yonkers Parking Auth.), 1597-g (Ogdensburg Port Auth.), 1598-f
(Poughkeepsie Parking Auth.), 1599-f (Niagara Falls Parking Auth.), 1599-

g (Cohoes Parking Auth., Schenectady Parking Auth., Binghamton Parking Auth.), (McKinney 1970); id. §§ 1287 (N.Y.S. Environmental Facilities Corp.), 1425-g (Hudson Parking Auth.), 1708 (Brooklyn Sports Center
Auth.), 1599-f (Olean Parking Auth.), 1599-g (Mount Vernon Parking
Auth.), 1599-gg (Village of Spring Valley Parking Auth.), 1599-ggg (Jamestown Parking Auth., Village of Mt. Kisco Auth.), 1599-gggg (City of Long
Beach Parking Auth.), 2312 (Auburn Indus. Devel. Auth.), 2469, 2508
(N.Y.S. Sports Auth.) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
31. See text accompanying notes 3-4 supra.
32. NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 343-1.0 (1971).
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contract, exclusive3 of so much thereof as shall be provided for in the subcontracts so adopted.1

This section is the general provision on reletting work under New
York City contracts. Unfortunately, its interpretation presents some
problems. First, subsection (a) seems to require a review of any
special bidding statutes which may have been enacted in regard to
contracts let by the various city agencies. Subsection (b) applies to
the failure of a contractor to fulfill the contract in "any respect."
What is a failure in any respect? Surely an abandonment is a failure. Yet, subsection (c) specifically applies to abandonments, and
not to the other varieties of failure contemplated by subsection (b).
Assuming that there is some rational basis to distinguish between
certain undefined failures and an abandonment, the Administrative
Code reacts differently to them and still does not make its intent
clear. If there is a failure other than an abandonment, subsection
(b) permits the agency in charge to complete the work in the manner
provided in the contract (whatever that may be), and charge the
completion costs (or presumably the remedial costs as well, although that is not stated) to the account of the delinquent contractor. Several questions ensue:
- What exactly is a failure to fulfill the contract within the
time limited for its performance?
- If the contractor is entitled to an extension of time to complete, does this subsection intend to deny to him that to which
he would otherwise be entitled?
- Does completion by the agency in charge mean that the
agency is to use its own personnel; or does it have the power to
relet the work?
- If the agency does relet the work, must there be competitive
bidding?
- Assuming the work is contracted to another firm without
competitive bidding, may the cost of completion exceed the
original contract price, or is this provision only operable when
completion cost is less?34
33. Id. To the extent that a local law does not conflict with N.Y. GEN.
§ 103 (McKinney 1965), the local law may co-exist with it. See

MUN. LAW

10 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 323 (1954).

34.

In Simermeyer v. Mayor, 16 App. Div. 445, 45 N.Y.S. 40 (1st Dep't
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Subsection (c) distinguishes between an abandonment and other
defaults; when there is an abandonment, all work which has not
been adopted under subcontracts is to be readvertised and relet
competitively.
What is confusing about the entire section is the unknown reason
behind proposing different remedies for general defaults as opposed
to abandonment. This is particularly disconcerting because Administrative Code provisions with respect to specific city agencies do not
always recognize this separation. For example, the applicable Board
of Water Supply statute provides as follows:
Public opening of bids; acceptance; rejection; readvertisement.-After the
expiration of the time limited in the advertisement, such bids on proposals
shall be publicly opened by the board of water supply and it may select the
bid or proposal, the acceptance of which will, in its judgment, best secure
the efficient performance of the work, or it may reject any or all of such bids.
In case of the rejection of all bids, the board of water supply shall readvertise
such contract, and shall receive and dispose of the bids tendered under such
advertisement in the manner hereinbefore provided for. In case any work
shall be abandoned by any contractor,or his contract terminatedpursuant
to the provisions thereof, it shall be readvertised and relet in the manner
provided for in this article for the original letting of such work."

If there is any rhymd or reason for the adoption of the defaultabandonment dichotomy in section 343-1.0 and its rejection in section K51-30.0 it is beyond comprehension. Given the confusion,
each and every piece of local legislation which might in any way
apply to the reletting of contracts in a given municipality must in
every instance be reviewed and researched before the necessity of
competitive bidding can be determined.
V.

The Public Emergency Exception
Perhaps the most conspicuous exception to the requirement for
1897), there was a default which was not an abandonment. The court ruled
that completion by the agency in charge, when the completion cost was less

than the sum due the defaulting contractor, and when abandonment is not
demonstrated, removes the completion from competitive bidding require-

ments. Whether this decision is merely an interpretation confined to NEW
YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. § 343-1.0 (1971), or is generally applicable
to the reletting question is unclear. This writer has chosen to treat it as

an apparent exception to bidding statutes.
35.

NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. § K51-30.0 (1971).
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public bidding-whether dealing with an original or an abandoned
contract-is the public emergency situation."
Where a public emergency exists, normal advertising for bids is
not required. 7 Section 103(4) of the General Municipal Law provides:
[I]n the case of a public emergency arising out of an accident or other
unforseen occurance or condition whereby circumstances affecting public
buildings, public property or the life, health, safety or property of the inhabitants of a political subdivision or district therein, require immediate action
which cannot await competitive bidding, contracts for public work or the
purchase of supplies, material or equipment may be let by the appropriate
officer, board or agency of a political subdivision or district therein."

While there are no cases specifically applying the public emergency exception to abandoned works, it is reasonable to expect that
the same principle applies. Courts, however, have been quite strict
in defining "public emergency." 39 Furthermore, the emergency exception is dangerous for the contractor. If the legality of the contract
is challenged successfully" even the good faith of both the contractor and the municipality will not be a defense."
Grimm v. City of Troy 2 discusses some of the prerequisites necessary before a court will declare an emergency situation. The case
involved garbage collection, the most common emergency situation
36.

McQuILLAN § 29.38. As an example, McQuillan offers the proposi-

tion that there need be no bidding when a public official, acting in good
faith to prevent the city from being left in darkness, contracts for temporary street lighting. Id.
37. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 103(4) (McKinney 1965).
38.

Id.

39. Rodin v. Director of Purchasing, 38 Misc. 2d 362, 238 N.Y.S.2d 2
(Sup. Ct. 1963).
40.

Id.

41.

Id. See also Prosper Contracting Corp. v. Board of Educ., 43 App.

Div. 2d 823, 351 N.Y.S.2d 402 (1st Dep't 1974). Although an emergency
question was not at issue, the contractor was not allowed to recover when
it did work as directed by a public official because the school board had
inadvertently failed to meet a purely ministerial requirement of its bidding
statute. The contractor, though innocent of wrongdoing and having concededly done the work, could not recover in a court proceeding. Id. at 823,
351 N.Y.S.2d at 403.
42. 60 Misc. 2d 579, 303 N.Y.S.2d 170 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
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reported. Ruling that there was an emergency affecting public
health, the court refused to interfere with the City Manager's failure
to submit work to bidding, and observed as follows:
The court is constrained to adopt a course which must give first consideration to the citizens of Troy. Section 103 of the General Municipal Law, which
governs the city's conduct, provides in subdivision 4 for emergency situations. An 'unforeseen' occurrence or condition is one which is not anticipated,
which creates a situationwhich cannot be remedied by the exercise of reasonable care or which is fortuitous. .

.

. Subdivision 4 provides an exception to

bidding requirements where circumstances affecting the life, health or safety
of the citizens of Troy require immediate action but situations of this kind
must be such as cannot reasonably be foreseen in time to advertise for bids. 3
4 4 the municipality, again
In Rodin v. Director of Purchasing,
45
relying on the emergency exception, passed a resolution authorizing the purchase of garbage trucks without competitive bidding.
The court enjoined the purchase, concluding that the need for the
trucks, albeit immediate at the time the resolution was enacted,
could have been foreseen months in advance. The importance of the
decision lies in the court's definition of "unforseen occurence or
condition" and its dictum on the effect of the municipality's good
faith:

Whether there was an emergency of the type defined by the statute turns
in the instant case on the meaning of the phrase 'unforseen occurrence or
condition.' An occurrence or condition is unforseen when it is not anticipated;
when it creates a situation which cannot be remedied by the exercise of
reasonable care .

. .

. The court notes that its determination in no way

impugns the good faith of the Town Board but that good faith does not
validate acts beyond the power of the board."

Similarly the State Comptroller 7 has concluded that the imminent breakdown of a fire district ambulance was not such an emergency that would except the purchase of a new ambulance from
43. Significantly, the court implied that the result would have been
different if fraud, conspiracy or other wrongdoing could be shown. Id. at
582, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 175.
44. 38 Misc. 2d 362, 238 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
45. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 103(4) (McKinney 1965).
46. 38 Misc. 2d at 364-65, 238 N.Y.S.2d at 5-6 (citations omitted).

47.

27 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 124 (1971).
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competitive bidding. However, certain buildings have been found to
be in such a state of disrepair as to require a contract for removal
without competitive bidding.4"
VI.

Apparent Exceptions

There are fact situations which give rise to additional apparent
exceptions to the rule requiring public bidding. For example,
Simermeyer v. Mayor4" considered a statute0 which provided that
when work was necessary to complete or perfect a particular job and
involved an expenditure in excess of $1,000, it was to be done by
contract, and, "[iun case any work shall be abandoned by any
contractor, it shall be readvertised and relet by the, head of the
appropriate department in the manner in this section provided." 5'
The city had engaged contractor Duffy to build a firehouse. The
contract provided that if the work was abandoned, or if the fire
commissioners, for reasons specified in the contract, should order
Duffy to discontinue the work, the city could have the work completed in any manner it would choose, and Duffy would be fully
liable for any costs in excess of the original contract price.
For an unexplained reason, Duffy's work was discontinued. The
plaintiffs then contracted with the city to complete the work for a
sum in excess of $1,000. The contract was not advertised for bids.
The trial court found a violation of the statute and denied recovery
to plaintiffs. The appellate division reversed:
The only question is whether the provision. . . of section 64 of the consolidation Act applies to this particular case. There is nothing whatever in the
evidence to show that the contract was abandoned by the contractor; all that
the evidence seems to indicate is that the commissioners of the fire department, for some reason which is not disclosed, undertook to complete themselves the work for the contractor, and as his agent, under that stipulation
of the contract which authorized the department so to do, if the work unnecessarily should be delayed or the contractor willfully violated any of the

48. For further discussions of the emergency exception in New York,
see Lutzken v. City of Rochester, 7 App. Div. 2d 498, 184 N.Y.S.2d 483 (4th
Dep't 1959); Sheehan v. City of New York, 37 Misc. 432, 75 N.Y.S. 802
(1902); 16 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 9 (1960); 13 Op. N.Y. ST. CoMP. 201 (1957)
(No. 60-905); Annot., 71 A.L.R. 173 (1931).
49. 16 App. Div. 445, 45 N.Y.S. 40 (1st Dep't 1897).
50. Law of July 1, 1882, ch. 410, § 64, [1882] N.Y. Laws 15.

51.

Id.
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conditions and covenants of the contract, or was executing it in bad faith, so
that the work could not be done according to its terms, and to apply the
contract compensation to the payment of the expense incurred in completing
the work. In this case these plaintiffs were merely employed to complete the
work specified in Duffy's contract at a cost less than the amount stipulated
to be paid to Duffy. So far as appears it was not upon an abandonment of
the contract by Duffy, but was under a contract made on his account, the
expense of which was to be borne by him, and what was done by the fire
commissioners was merely to complete, within the limit of cost of Duffy's
contract, that work which they deemed it expedient to finish under Duffy's
contract. 2

Permeating the decision is the court's desire to avoid imposing a
forfeiture against the innocent plaintiffs who concededly had rendered the services sued upon, with the decisive factor being the
conclusion that this "work" was not a new contract. Hence, to avoid
the penalties of a violation of a bidding statute under these circumstances, it must be shown that no new contract was created, this
then being an apparent exception to the rule.
A somewhat similar rationale is found in City of New York v.
Duffy,53 where the contractor for a public works project did abandon
the job. Upon abandonment, the contractor's surety offered to complete the work under the contract. The city declined this offer, readvertised for bids, and sued the contractor and the surety for the
money spent over and above the original contract price. Defendants
alleged that the city had been obligated to allow the surety to complete the project.
In ruling for the city, the court considered two factors: the original
contract, which granted the city the power to complete the contract
as prescribed by law upon abandonment; and a statute,5 4 which
required competitive bidding for completion work:
I see no escape from the express provision of the contract which gave the
city the right to declare the contract abandoned and thereupon to contract
for its completion in the manner prescribed by law. Perhaps the city might
properly have allowed the surety to finish the work. But, under the contract it was not bound to do so. At most, the contract gave the city the right
52. 16 App. Div. at 448, 45 N.Y.S. at 41-42.
53. 129 Misc. 251, 221 N.Y.S. 247 (Sup. Ct. 1927), aff'd mem., 232
N.Y.S. 715 (1st Dep't 1929).
54. Law of Apr. 22, 1901, ch. 466, § 419, [1901] N.Y. Laws 186, as
amended, Law of Apr. 13, 1922, ch. 661, [1922] N.Y. Laws 1817.
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to decide whether it would intrust the completion of the work to the surety,
as such, or advertise for bids. It chose the latter course and, so far as appears,
there was nothing to prevent the surety from either bidding or procuring a
bid to be made on its behalf."

Again, even though the statute required competitive bidding for
abandoned work, the surety could have brought in a contractor of
its own choosing, had the city consented, and arranged for it to
complete the work without competitive bidding. It did not happen
in this case, but it remains possible that a surety's substitute is
another (apparent) exception to the general rule.
VII.

Further Exceptions and Their Relationship to General
Municipal Law Section 103

General Municipal Law section 103 is the most important New
York statute, at least insofar as volume of litigation is concerned,
with reference to the letting of public contracts. Subdivision 1 delineates the most relevant "advertising-for-bid" requirements:
Except as otherwise expressly provided .

.

. all contracts for public work

involving an expenditure of more than thirty-five hundred dollars and all
purchase contracts involving an expenditure of more than fifteen hundred
dollars, shall be awarded by the appropriate officer, board or agency of a
political subdivision or of any district therein including but not limited to a
soil conservation district, to the lowest responsible bidder, furnishing the
required security after advertisement for sealed bids in the manner provided
by this section. In any case where a responsible bidder's gross price is reducible by an allowance for the value of used machinery, equipment, apparatus
or tools to be traded in by a political subdivision, the gross price shall be
reduced by the amount of such allowance, for the purpose of determining the
low bid. In cases where two or more responsible bidders furnishing the required security submit identical bids as to price, such officer, board or agency
may award the contract to any of such bidders. Such officer, board or agency
may, in his or its discretion, reject all bids and re-advertise for new bids in
the manner provided by this section."

Nowhere does this section specifically address itself to abandoned
or defaulted work. To be sure, it does speak of "all public contracts." But whether a contract based upon abandoned or defaulted
work-i.e., a reletting-is included in such apparently pervasive
language is, or should be, arguable. Logically, the question is so
55.
56.

129 Misc. at 252, 221 N.Y.S. at 248-49.
N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 103(1) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
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postulated because abandoned work is an "extraordinary" situation, akin in part to an initial contract and in part to an emergency
contract, falling somewhere in between as particular circumstances
may dictate.
The principal element of the "mixed definitional nature" of abandoned or defaulted work is time. One illustration would be the construction of a public office building. 7 Once the project begins the
public body may lease its existing office space to another party,
relying on some completion target date, which is usually flexible
given the normal vicissitudes of construction work. While an abandonment of the project prior to completion would not be an emergency under the terms of the statute and the relevant cases," the
obvious effect upon the public body may very well approach emergency proportions: its immediate need to occupy the building" may
not permit the passage of time necessary to formulate the plans and
specifications remaining, to advertise them for bids, and to include
sufficient lead time for contractors to formulate their bids. Thus,
the time that is available to a municipality when a project is conceived does not exist. Concurrently, rising construction costs and
material shortages compound the problem."0 Nonetheless, the emergency excuse is unavailable.6
Must the mandate of the General Municipal Law 2 or other more
general bidding statutes 3 apply? One authority, under very narrow
circumstances, merely assumes that it does." The remaining
sources dismiss its applicability, 5 and provide other apparent exceptions to the general rule.
The State Comptroller's Opinion 6 which found the General Mu57. Similar although not necessarily identical arguments could be advanced for sewers, subways, highways, bridges, etc.
58. See text accompanying notes 42-54 supra.
59. Or to put the sewer or subway or bridge into use.
60. One could interpret the enactment of NEW YORK, N.Y., ADMIN.
CODE ANN. § 343-1.0 (1971) as support for the view that the N.Y. GEN.
MUN. LAW (McKinney 1965) does not cover the field.

61. See text accompanying notes 42-54 supra.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 103 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
See text accompanying notes 31-35 supra.
18 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 252 (1962).
Id. at 395; 16 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 140 (1960).
Id. at 395; 16 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 140 (1960).
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nicipal Law applicable, involved, in significant part, the terms of
Town Law section 277,67 providing that if a town declares a performance bond covering improvements in subdivisions to be in default,
the town may:
[C]ollect the sum remaining payable thereunder and upon the receipt of the
proceeds thereof the town shall install such improvements as are covered by
such performance bond and are commensurate with the extent of building
development that has taken place in the subdivision but not exceeding in cost
the amount of such proceeds."

Given both a contract default and the statute, the Comptroller
concluded that if the work to be contracted for is in excess of $2,500,
there must be competitive bidding. 9 The Comptroller noted the
general rule that when work is abandoned and no special statute
applies to reletting, completion may proceed without competitive
bidding, but explained that in such situations, the performance
bond usually gives the surety the right to complete. Nevertheless,
he found that right inconsistent with the terms of the Town Law,
and without further explanation, observed that the work must be
submitted to competitive bidding. 0
An additional permutation of the rule is found in a 1960 opinion
of the State Comptroller.7 A fire district had let a contract pursuant
to competitive bidding; subsequently both the general contractor
and a subcontractor defaulted, the latter having completed slightly
in excess of 5 percent of its work.
The defaulting subcontractor's bonding company urged the fire
district to sign a contract with a new electrician supplied by the
67.

N.Y. TOWN LAW § 277(1)

(McKinney Supp. 1974).

68. Id.
69. 18 OP. N.Y. ST. CoMP. 252 (1962). This threshold amount has since
been changed to $3,500. N.Y. GEN. MUN. LAW § 103 (McKinney Supp.
1974).
70. 18 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 252 (1962). The comptroller also cited as
support for this conclusion N.Y. GEN. MuN. LAW § 103 (McKinney 1965).
Comparing this opinion to others, it seems that the Comptroller intended
it to apply only to situations involving Town Law section 277, although
even this hypothesis conflicts with the Comptroller's rejection of the applicability of General Municipal Law section 103(1). See 18 Op. N.Y. ST.
COMP. 395 (1962); 16 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 140 (1960).
71. 16 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 140 (1960).
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bonding company, the terms of the new contract were meant to
fulfill the original specifications. Based upon these facts, the Comptroller stated that General Municipal Law section 103, requiring
public bidding of municipal contracts, contains no provision for
readvertising. The Comptroller noted that:
It is our opinion that where a subcontractor has defaulted, a municipality
may, without readvertising, enter into a contract, for the completion of the
work, with a contractor furnished by the bonding company. Conclusion: The
fire district may enter into a new contract with the subcontractor without
competitive bidding. 7"

Unfortunately, by combining two concepts the Comptroller leaves
the waters murky. The conclusion says the completion of an abandoned contract need not be submitted to competitive bidding. However, the body of the ruling contains an important distinction, which
is most likely the actual meaning, that a new contractor supplied
by the bonding company may be engaged without the constraints
73
of competitive bidding.
An extension of this concept occurs in a later ruling," involving
school construction which was 98 percent complete when the contract was terminated due to abandonment by the contractor. The
bonding company, while it would not propose completion by a contractor of its own choosing, did consent to the board's hiring a new
contractor to complete the work. Finding the surety's consent essentially the same as the surety's substitution of its own contractor, the
Comptroller affirmed the earlier decision,75 stating that the completion contract need not be submitted to competitive bidding. To
support this proposition, the Comptroller concluded that there was
no statute authorizing a reletting pursuant to competitive bidding."6
The Comptroller cited In re Leeds" as analogous, and quoted the
following language from that decision:
The laws of 1859, providing for laying out sewer districts in the city of Brooklyn, authorizes commissioners to advertise and let the work to the lowest

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id.
18 Op. N.Y. ST. ComP. 395 (1962).
Id.
Id.
53 N.Y. 400 (1873).
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bidder, and contains the following provision: 'The said commissioners shall,
in no case, proceed with the construction of any sewer except upon the advertisement for proposals for the construction of the same as herein provided.'
This provision, I think, applies only to the contract for the original construction of the sewer. The language of the statute seems to contemplate that, and
nothing else. The commissioners are to lay out and arrange the districts, then
to advertise for the construction of any part of the work, and then to award
the work so advertised to the lowest bidder; and then comes the prohibition
above quoted, which does not, in terms at least, extend beyond the letting
and advertisement before provided for. It does not say that no work shall be
performed upon sewers unless it is advertised and let to the lowest bidders.
The original contract expressly provides that in case the contractor unnecessarily delays the work, he may be turned off upon four days' notice, and the
commissioners may complete the same by contract, or otherwise, and at the
expense of the contractor. When the work is performed under this provision,
that it should be advertised, nor required to be let to
it is not contemplated
78
the lowest bidder.

The Comptroller concluded that the effect of General Municipal
Law section 103(1) was similar to the effect of the statute cited in
Leeds."9 The Comptroller stated that:
General Municipal Law § 103(1), as it relates to public work contracts,
requires all such contracts in excess of $2,500 to be awarded to the lowest
responsible bidder after public advertisement.
Although the language in § 103(1) is not identical to that of the bidding
statute in the Leeds case, it is our opinion that the reasoning of said case
would, nevertheless, be applicable to contracts let pursuant to § 103(1).1

VIII. Conclusion
Because of the severe penalties upon contractors who have entered into illegal contracts"2 the question of whether or not a completion contract for abandoned or defaulted work must be relet pursuant to competitive bidding is of considerable significance. While
78. Id. (citation omitted).
79. Law of Apr. 16, 1859, ch. 385, § 4, [1859] N.Y. Laws 908.
80. 18 Op. N.Y. ST. COMP. 395 (1962).
81. Id. See also Connelly v. City of Elmira, 144 Misc. 282, 258 N.Y.S.2d
603 (1932): "[It has long been held that a common council or other
municipal board or commission has the power and right to award a contract without calling for competitive bids, where no statutory or charter
provision requires competitive bidding." Id. at 283, 258 N.Y.S.2d at 605
(citations omitted).
82. See text accompanying notes 27-41 supra.
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the general rule states that competitive bidding requirements are
dispensed with upon abandonment, if the municipality has the
power under the contract to complete the work and charge the defaulting party, this rule ignores the more basic question of statutory
analysis.83
The statutes, in turn, which are more relevant to any discussion
of the law in this area, may be divided into two categories for the
purpose of analysis: (1) general-those which refer to bidding while
ignoring the reletting question; and, (2) specific-those which address themselves to re!etting.
The numerous general statutes essentially conform to the one
most important legislative formulation, that of General Municipal
Law section 103(1), which requires that public contracts be submitted to competitive bidding. This section, however, does not specifically set out its effect upon abandoned or defaulted work. All but
one of the cases found conclude that, in the absence of such specificity, the statute does not apply. To the extent that they are convincing, the practicalities of municipal needs and the realities of construction and supply argue in favor of this interpretation. The one
contrary result was based upon a comparative analysis of Town Law
section 277,84 but was, in any event, contra to the premises in all the
other decisions.8 5
As far as the specific laws are concerned, the existence of some
reference to reletting in the New York City statutes leads to the
conclusion that all local laws must always be consulted. There is
considerable confusion in the specific New York City sections on
this point on two grounds. First, the purportedly all encompassing
section 343-1.08 has an inexplicable internal separation of procedures based upon default versus abandonment. Second, the presumably more specific section K51-30.0 does not adopt this distinction. 7
Whatever the foundation for this disparity may be, the obfuscation is further blurred by the various exceptions to the statutes, as
follows:
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

See text accompanying
See text accompanying
See text accompanying
See text accompanying
See text accompanying

notes 32-35 supra.
notes 66-70 supra.
notes 71-81 supra.
notes 32-34 supra.
note 35 supra.
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(a) public emergency;
(b) no abandonment shown, completion construed to be a
continuation of the initial contract;
(c) the surety may substitute a contractor of its own choice;
(d) a contractor consented to by the surety, although not necessarily supplied by the surety, may be substituted.
Thus, in New York City, to determine whether a discontinued
public contract must be relet competitively, the following questions
must be explored and answered:
(1) Is the contract covered by section 343-1.0 or by some other
Code section applicable to a specific agency?
(2) If it comes within the purview of section 343-1.0, was the
cessation caused by an abandonment specifically or by another
default?
(3) If the default was not an abandonment, subject to the
confusion of section 343-1.0(b), it presumably need not be submitted to competitive bidding.
(4) If there was an abandonment, it must be relet, unless the
situation falls into one of the exceptions.
(5) If there is a more specific Code section which rules, such
as section K51-3.0, reletting is probably required unless one of
the exceptions applies.
Outside New York City, where there is no local statute
specifically applicable, neither General Municipal Law section
103(1) nor the other general statutes should prohibit the reletting
without competitive bidding.
These conclusions raise two important questions. The first is
whether a contractor who contemplates assuming a defaulted or
abandoned public works contract, and hence the severe penalties for
its possible illegality, must take on the risks that arise from the
confusion on a question which is supposed to be a matter of long
standing legislative and judicial policy.
The second question is a value judgment, which, like the first,
deserves the attention of any legislative body concerned with public
contracts. Except for New York City, the New York State policy of
contracting abandoned or defaulted work free of the constraints and
safeguards of bidding procedures, leaves room for favoritism or possible waste of public funds. At the same time, however, the bureaucratic morass is avoided when a public project needs to be rushed
to a conclusion. Which is more important?

